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the origins and development of a largely seventeenth-century dramatic form and genre called the German Trauerspiel: a play of mourning, or more simply if inaccurately put by the book"s English translator John Osborne, German tragic drama.
In the Trauerspiel book Benjamin takes up Schmitt"s notion of sovereignty, only to subtly alter and thereby undermine it. In contrast to Schmitt"s sovereign, whose reality and title depends upon the capacity to make the all-important decision on the exception, Benjamin"s seventeenth-century baroque prince embodies absolute sovereignty and yet is plagued by the incapacity to decide on the exception. Given the direct references in the text to Schmitt, and based on the fact that the entire second half of Benjamin"s book spells out a theory of allegory, Benjamin"s castrated (i.e. incapacitated) sovereign is, inter alia, clearly an allegorical avatar belonging to Benjamin"s contemporaneous political crisis in Germany during the Weimar Republic (and in Europe more generally). By way of allegory Benjamin uses the seventeenth-century German play of mourning to critique Schmitt and his contemporary historical situation of the permanent state of exception. In the course of Benjamin"s understated and ingenious critique of Schmitt in the Trauerspiel book, the stakes of this supposed intellectual match become clear: for Schmitt, there is no law, or force-of-law, beyond the constituent political violence that founds law; for Benjamin, the ambiguity and tension at the heart of the paradoxical articulation of the sovereign"s role (as he who decides on the exception, and who therefore, in Schmitt"s words, "stands outside the normally valid legal system," and yet who "nevertheless belongs to it, for it is he who must decide whether the constitution needs to be suspended in its entirety" uncovered.
By paying careful attention to Benjamin"s original German, we can patiently and by slightly different means rearticulate this claim of the sovereign"s incapacity to decide. The German original, with John Osborne"s English translation, reads:
"Der Fürst, bei dem die Entscheidung über den Ausnahmezustand ruht, erweist in der erstbesten Situation, daß ein Entschluß ihm fast unmöglich ist [The prince, who is responsible for making the decision to proclaim the state of emergency, reveals, at the first opportunity, that he is almost incapable of making a decision]." 3 
Benjamin further clarifies: "Das ist die Entschlußunfähigkeit des Tyrannen [this is
the indecisiveness of the tyrant]." 4 The German term "Entschlußunfähigkeit" calls attention to itself here.
Osborne"s translation choice of "indecisiveness" is a terrible one, but his translation failure turns out to be our success, for it helps to highlight a crucial subtlety in Benjamin"s chosen term. Indecisiveness suggests an aporetic condition inherent in the subject. Alternately, "undecidability" offers another interesting rendition.
However, undecidability indicates an aporetic condition focused mostly on its inherence in an object. Samuel Weber has suggested a more literal translation into English, rendering Entschlußunfähigkeit as "the incapacity [of the tyrant] to decide." 5 While obviously related, the more precise term for indecisiveness in in mind the truth of the fiction: that despite being the sovereign, or as Benjamin says, the "lord of creatures," that role is radically marked by an as if. Regardless of how high and mighty the sovereign appears to himself and others, he remains just a creature like any other. As Jacob Taubes might put it, the sovereign can take the elevators up to the high rises of divinity, but it will not help. 10 The result is that the sovereign, whose power draws on the form of transcendence, relies precisely on to the extent that he refers to his nature, to his personal quality, as the justification of his authority, he designates his nature as something other, without being able to account for it rationally." 13 The figure of the sovereign reduces ultimate authority to a personal entity, while equally reducing all others to a homogeneous category of "non-peers"; for who shall be the peer of the sovereign? In this way the sovereign wills himself to a fictionalized position of difference, or transcendence. In this way 11 Samuel Weber, supra note 5: 188. 12 Among other excellent sources, for more on this claim to the historical (i.e. contemporary) tendency for the norm to become exceptionality, see Giorgio Agamben"s " In this book Spinoza agrees that miracles happen. But far from transgressing natural laws, he understands miracles as natural, law-like events the causes of which we simply do not know. The exception operates analogously according to Benjamin: the sovereign operation defies explanation by the law itself, but not because it is buoyed by a transcendent grace. Rather, to ventriloquize Spinoza, the sovereign"s decision on the state of exception is only intelligible as in relation to human opinion. In other words, the state of exception defies understanding by the law only as we currently understand the law.
We can now begin to re-imagine the Benjamin-Schmitt relationship: this time, for philosophical authority on the relation of the exception to the universal. In particular as highlighted by the relation to the demonic, the sovereign"s problem of expression ultimately boils down to the fundamental tension in the Janus-like dual identity of the sovereign as equally both tyrant and martyr. For Carl Schmitt"s part, he certainly understands the tyrannical potential of his sovereign, and accepts it readily. This is the Hobbesian side of Schmitt-the sovereign may and must act in a manner that could objectively be described as oppressive, even and especially with the preservation of the State as justification.
Prior to an investigation of the category of sovereign-as-martyr that pursues it strictly in its (bound) relation to the figure of the tyrant, the term"s autonomous Reine in Benjamin"s terms indicates a problematic, paradoxical relationship between the inside and outside of the law, in particular between the potentiality of law and the actuality of the law. Using Lacanian terms, reine Gewalt can be understood as an extimate force-a potentiality de actu and an actuality de potentia.
This extimate, pure violence (or force) deposes (entsetzt) the law. Entsetzen typically translates as "to displace." To translate it here, in this context, with the rather appropriate legal term "to depose" is telling indeed. In common parlance it means to remove or displace from high office or high position. But think also of legal deposition: to give testimony or affirmation under oath-in other words, to bear witness to the truth of an event. The original Greek sense of "martyr"
indicates precisely this: to witness; to depose. The sovereign as martyr is witness not to the continued joining and bringing-into-relation of the state of exception and the law, but is the only first-hand witness to the law in its ultimate zone of ontological indistinction between potentiality and actuality. He plays witness to the disarticulation of the relation between some supposedly original, primary force and the law which exists as the signification of that force.
This martyrdom is yet another indicator of the truth of the indecisiveness of the sovereign: he does not create a new constitution, let alone a new juridical order, when he decides on the state of exception. To suspend the juridical order in its entirety does not therefore admit to a decision for a particular new order. In fact, it cannot be that; otherwise, it would not be a state of exception in which the juridical order was suspended. The sovereign decides on the exception, which can only be a condition of possibility for a new norm. In this sense, then, the sovereign is truly incapable of deciding-from the perspective of the juridical order.
The tension and concomitant troubled expression of Benjamin"s baroque sovereign unfolds rhetorically in the form of a chiasm: the tyrant identity morphs into a martyr and the martyr shifts into a tyrant. When the sovereign is most tyrant, when he "indulges in the most violent display of power," he becomes a martyr: "he falls victim to the disproportion between the unlimited hierarchical dignity, with which he is divinely invested and the humble estate of his Entschlußunfähigkeit at the limits of the sovereign operation.
The chiasmatic relation of the sovereign"s Janus-like identity anchors the sovereign"s actions with a kind of a coherent foundation-but, crucially, it is a contradictory coherence. Of this structure, Jacques Derrida explains in "Structure, 
BENJAMIN WITH SCHMITT: THE POLITICS OF THE REAL
What is to be learned here from Benjamin"s implicit critique of Schmitt in the
Trauerspiel study? After all, the history of the "real" state of exception that i.e. to disenchant, does not reveal a purity, an origin, or a previously given apparatus to which we might have direct access. 35 Rather, we see more clearly the truth in the fiction, in the ideology, in the methodology, and so on.
The question thus remains: what is this "something" that these terms fractured in their emergence as opposition, dialectical terms? What is this "purity" in the Benjaminian sense to which we "have no other access than through the fiction of [these terms and their relations"] articulation"? 36 In his precious final paragraph, Agamben calls this atopos, this space-which-is-a-non-space: "politics."
Certainly politics is at stake in seeking the grounds of the articulation between law and life-the stakes could not be higher. But, in a decidedly materialist move, I
wish to re-mark this description by Agamben, and perhaps also Benjamin"s notion of "purity" more generally, including "pure law," "pure language," and "pure violence." I wish to re-mark this "something" to which Though what he desires is admirable-a political action "which severs the nexus between violence and law"
40
-it appears to re-enchant, as it were, at least insofar as it poses politics as an origin point, or that "something" otherwise inaccessible.
The truly intriguing assumption in this case is that we assume there is something there in the first place; in other words, a rather traditional transitive model of causality is presupposed. However, immanent causality guides this particular procedure. Immanent causality consists in what might otherwise be called self-causation. What is from the initial perspective considered an origin, the perspective of immanent causality knows only from its effects. In a coinage that bears greatly upon the situation of sovereign authority, Kiarina Kordela calls this particular model of causality (based largely on Spinoza"s thought, in particular his insight that truth is an index of both itself and the false): secular causality. 41 In this context, politics may be that which never existed prior to the charged relation between life and law, but is literally a kind of effect of its own effects-it is immanent to its own effects and does not exist except through its effects. Though
Agamben might readily agree with this, his adherence to a vocabulary that depends heavily on transitive causality burdens his final appeal to politics.
Lacan explains his theorization of the Real in terms similar to Kordela"s Spinozist secular causality. The Real is "the essential object which isn't an object any longer, but this something faced with which all words cease and all categories 37 Ibid. 
